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A
mAbstract
Workers who become work-incapacitated may try to change employer or stay
with their current employer in an accommodated job. We study the effect of these
strategies on sick-listed workers’ employment durations. We use survey and register data
of 809 workers. We simultaneously estimate the duration until returning to work and the
duration of employment using the timing-of-event approach. We find that workplace
accommodations increase employment durations with the current employer. We also
find that workers returning to work with a new employer have significantly shorter
employment durations than workers returning to work with the current employer (with
or without accommodations).
JEL codes: I12 ,J21; J28; J64
Keywords: Sick leave; Workplace accommodation; Employment duration; Hazard rate
model1. Introduction
Illness and work disability warrant great concern among decision makers and re-
searchers because of the negative consequences both at the individual and the societal
level. At the societal level, ill health reduces the labour supply (Berkowitz and Johnson
1974) and impounds considerable resources to the financing of social security benefits
(Eurostat 2009). As a consequence, decision makers have devoted much energy to find-
ing ways of increasing the labour market attachment of people with ill health.
While some workers acquiring a work-limiting health problem remain in their job
without changing job conditions, many workers change job conditions through either
workplace accommodations or a job change (Daly and Bound 1996; Campolieti 2009).
This paper studies how these two responses influence the labour market attachment of
long-term sick-listed workers after they resume work.
As health-related work absenteeism may arise because of a mismatch between the
worker’s capacities and current job demands (Nagi 1965; Verbrugge and Jette 1994),
policies affecting the supply-side or the demand-side may reduce work absenteeism.
Supply-side policies include vocational rehabilitation programs with measures like edu-
cation and job training that may increase the individuals’ working capacity for meeting
the job demands (e.g. Frölich et al. 2004). Demand-side policies may alter employers’
demand for workers with ill health by subsidizing employers or mandating them to
hire or accommodate workers with health problems (e.g. Burkhauser et al. 1995). ForHøgelund and Holm; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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disabilities, and the ‘Americans with Disabilities Act’ in the United States mandates
employers to provide reasonable accommodations for disabled workers.
Many economic studies have assessed factors that may affect the labour supply of
people with disabilities (for literature surveys, see Bound and Burkhauser 1999; Currie
and Madrian 1999). In contrast, few studies have investigated conditions that influence
whether workers remain in the workforce after the onset of a health condition
(Burkhauser et al. 1995; Butler et al. 1995; Daly and Bound 1996; Campolieti 2005)1.
These studies have focused on how reductions of job demands may improve the
labour market attachment of disabled workers. Daly and Bound (1996) showed that
job demands can be lowered through workplace accommodations or a job change.
Thus after the onset of a disability the worker may either continue to work for the
employer, which provides accommodations that reduce job demands, or change em-
ployer. Burkhauser et al. (1995) found that accommodations increase the employ-
ment duration of US workers acquiring a disability by a factor of almost three. Butler
et al. (1995) found that Canadian workers with permanent partial impairments who
returned to work with modified equipment, light workloads or reduced working
hours had significantly more stable labour market attachment than workers who did
not have their working conditions accommodated. Campolieti (2005), who studied
the employment duration of workers with permanent partial impairments who
returned to work after a work injury, also found a positive effect of workplace ac-
commodations. However, the size of the accommodation estimates was much smaller
than those found by Burkhauser et al. (1995). Campolieti (2005: 497) concludes that
this difference suggests that workplace accommodations may be more effective in
preventing departures from employment for workers who have not previously left
the workforce for health reasons than for workers who are re-entering after an occu-
pational injury.
Only few studies have investigated the consequences of returning to work for the
pre-disability employer versus returning to work for a new employer. These studies
suggest that the pre-injury employer has a significant impact on disabled worker’s sub-
sequent labour market outcomes. For example, Campolieti (2004) found that workers
who returned to the pre-injury employer were more likely to receive accommodations
than workers who returned to another employer. Campolieti and Krashinsy (2006)
found that permanently impaired male workers who returned to the pre-accident em-
ployer had significantly higher wages than workers who did not return to the pre-injury
employer.
We contribute to the literature by examining the effects of job change and workplace
accommodations on the employment duration of long-term sick-listed workers in a
novel way. We study whether workers remaining with their employer in an accommo-
dated job after a sick leave have longer employment durations than workers who either
change employer or remain with their employer in a non-accommodated job. We use
survey and register data of 809 long-term sick-listed workers to estimate a joint propor-
tional mixed hazard rate model with two durations, i.e. the competing risk duration
until returning to work (in an accommodated job with the current employer, in a non-
accommodated job with the current employer, or in a job with a new employer) and
the duration of the subsequent employment.
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ies estimated the effect of workplace accommodations among people with per-
manently reduced working capacity, we assess their effect on people who received
a temporary working incapacity benefit, i.e. sickness benefit. Compared to work
injured workers with permanent impairments, workers receiving temporary work-
ing incapacity benefit are a much larger group. Second, we provide new evidence
about the effects of workplace accommodations in a European (Scandinavian)
context.
Third, as the first study we assess whether changing workplace is a better strat-
egy to cope with a health condition than staying with the pre-sick leave employer
in an accommodated job. Thus, we study not only whether workplace accommo-
dations prolong employment spells at the current employer but also whether
long-term sick-listed workers who change employer have longer employment
spells. The finding of Daly and Bound (1996)–that disabled workers who changed
employer more often report a reduction in job demands than workers who re-
main with their employer–indicates that long-term sick-listed workers changing
employer may have longer subsequent employment durations than long-term
sick-listed workers who remain with their employer. Yet workers starting to work
for a new employer do not know with certainty whether they match the new job,
an uncertainty that may reduce the quality of the employer-employee match and
hence also reduce the employment duration.
Fourth, our data and a recent econometric approach enable us to adjust for
possible selection effects in a more comprehensive way than previous studies.
Burkhauser et al. (1995) and Campolieti (2005) estimated a single spell duration
model with individual specific random effects. However, when researchers only
have information from one spell distinguishing unobserved heterogeneity from
duration dependence is difficult. In a single spell analysis a decreasing hazard
rate out of employment over time may reflect either that the hazard rate is in-
deed decreasing or that some people have unobserved characteristics that make
them exit employment quickly. Therefore, the identification of unobserved het-
erogeneity in single-spell duration models hinges on a misspecification of the
functional form of the baseline hazard rate or the functional form of the unob-
served heterogeneity (van den Berg 2001). We use information of two interrelated
durations (the duration until returning to work and the subsequent employment
duration), thereby improving the identification of possible unobserved heterogen-
eity. With this approach, our econometric model should better than the models
used in previous studies mitigate possible selection problems that may lead to
bias in the estimated effect of workplace accommodations.
We find that individuals remaining with their employer in an accommodated
job have longer subsequent employment durations than both individuals who
change employer and those individuals remaining with their employer in a non-
accommodated job.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
the Danish disability policy, and Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains our
econometric model, and Section 5 presents our findings and the results of robustness
checks to our empirical model. Section 6 concludes.
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In Denmark public authorities are largely responsible for the financing of sickness,
disability and work injury benefits and for the efforts of integrating working incapaci-
tated people into the labour market. Employers, however, have a relatively modest
responsibility (Høgelund 2003).
The public sickness benefit program gives full wage compensation up to a ceiling cap
that equals the maximum unemployment benefit. Workers can receive the benefit for
up to 52 weeks, but the benefit period may be extended under certain circumstances,
e.g. if the worker has an ongoing workers’ compensation or disability benefit claim.
Employers finance their workers’ sickness benefits for the first three weeks, and public
authorities finance the remaining period.
The municipality is obligated to perform an assessment of all sickness benefit cases
within eight weeks after the first day of sick leave. The primary goal of the assessments
is to restore the sick-listed worker’s labour market attachment. The assessments must
take place in cooperation with the sick-listed worker and other relevant agents, such as
the employer and medical experts.
To promote sick-listed workers’ return to work, the municipality can establish
vocational rehabilitation, including education, wage-subsidized job training, and
subsidies to workplace accommodations. If return to ordinary work is impossible
because of permanently reduced working capacity, the municipality may refer the
sick-listed worker to a ‘flexjob’, a wage-subsidized job with job tasks accommodated
to the worker’s working capacity and usually with reduced working hours. If a person
with permanently reduced working capacity is incapable of working in a flexjob, the
municipality may award a disability benefit, which is financed entirely by public
authorities.
In addition to the employers’ limited responsibility for the financing of work incap-
acity benefits, they can fairly easily dismiss workers on sick leave, i.e. in these cases em-
ployers are not obliged to reemploy workers when their sick leave ends (Høgelund
2003). Furthermore, until recently employers had no legal obligation to accommodate
the working conditions of sick-listed workers. This situation changed in December
2004 when Denmark ratified the European Union directive on equal treatment in
employment and occupation (European Union 2000). However, as the sick-listed em-
ployees in this study ended their sick leave approximately one year after the Danish
parliament decided to ratify the directive, it is unlikely that the directive has had a sig-
nificant effect on the sick leave spells in our data2.
In sum, the Danish policy towards people with health problems is characterized by a
relatively big public responsibility and a relatively limited responsibility of employers.3. Data and descriptive statistics
3.1. Data sources
This paper uses data from a stratified representative sample of workers who were con-
tinuously sick-listed for more than eight weeks. The sample comprises 1,393 persons
who ended their sick leave between January 1 and July 31, 20063. The data was col-
lected primarily to describe the municipalities’ follow-up activities and their effects on
the labour market attachment of the long-term sick-listed (Høgelund, et al. 2008). The
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activities happen after the eighth week of sick leave and because the lion’s share of sick
leave spells end before the eight week. Thus the sampling procedure ensures a suffi-
cient number of long-lasting sick leave cases where case management activities and
employer-established workplace accommodations are present in the data. However,
without sick leave cases shorter than nine weeks, our estimates of the effect of work-
place accommodations on the subsequent employment duration may not be valid for
sick-listed workers with short sick leave durations.
Using a national register of closed sickness benefit cases, we drew the sample in 39
municipalities that resemble the 271 Danish municipalities for size and geographical lo-
cation. We contacted the sick-listed workers during March–May 2007, on average
19 months after their first day of sick leave (and on average 10 months after payment
of sickness benefit ended). We obtained telephone interviews with 987 persons, giving
a response rate of 71. We exclude 101 persons who were not wage earners at the begin-
ning of the sick leave, 71 persons with missing information on the dependent variables,
and 6 persons with missing information on the covariates. The remaining 809 persons
constitute our analytical sample.
We matched the survey data to register information from Statistic Denmark’s
‘Integrated Database for Labour Market Research’ and ‘the Database of Health Care
Services’. These databases contain information about socio-demographic characteris-
tics, previous labour market attachment, and the number of visits to both general
practitioners and specialists before the sick leave.3.2. Dependent variables
Our empirical model comprises two durations. The first duration lasts from the first
day of sick leave until returning to work for (1) the current employer with workplace
accommodations, (2) the current employer without workplace accommodations, and
(3) a new employer. We define ‘work’ as ordinary work or flexjob employment4. We
treat sick-listed workers entering the disability benefit program as right-censored cases
at the moment they are awarded disability benefit5. For sick-listed workers resuming
work, the second duration lasts from the date of returning to work until the employ-
ment ends.
We measure workplace accommodations in four questions. The respondents were
asked if (and if so, when) their current employer established (1) reduced working hours,
(2) a new job on ordinary conditions, (3) a new job on special and less demanding con-
ditions, and (4) adaptations in terms of special equipment or office remodelling. To as-
sess the effect of workplace accommodations, we estimate two models. The first model
includes a dummy variable that measures whether the sick-listed worker returned to
accommodated work, i.e. respondents answered yes to at least one of the four ques-
tions. The second model comprises dummy variable for each of the four types of
accommodations6.
Five hundred eighty-nine sick-listed workers (73 per cent) returned to work. Table 1
shows that 26 per cent returned to work for the current employer with workplace
accommodations, 28 per cent returned to the current employer without workplace
accommodations, and 19 percentages points returned to a new employer. In other
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for dependent variables
Mean Std. dev.
Not returning to work 0.272 0.445
Returning to work with current employer in accommodated job 0.263 0.441
Returning to work with current employer without accommodations 0.279 0.449
Returning to work with new employer 0.185 0.389
Duration until returning to work with current employer in accommodated joba) 5.446 3.635
Duration until returning to work with current employer without accommodationsb) 5.270 3.709
Duration until returning to work with new employerc) 9.967 6.442
Employment durationd) 4.955 4.463
Reduced working hours, current employere) 0.363 0.481
New job, current employerf) 0.167 0.373
Light duties, current employerg) 0.150 0.358
Adaptations, current employerg) 0.132 0.338
a): n = 213, b): n = 226, c): n = 150, d): n = 110, e): n = 435, f): n =432 , g): n =433 , h): n = 433.
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without workplace accommodations, and 46 per cent of the sick-listed workers adapted
to the onset of their disability by either changing employer or leaving the labour force.
The most commonly workplace accommodation is reduced working hours. Among
those who returned to work with their current employer 36 percentage had their hours
reduced. The sick-listed workers less often received workplace accommodations in
terms of a new job (17 per cent), a light duty job (15 per cent), or adaptations as special
equipment or rebuilding of the office (13 per cent).3.3. Explanatory variables
We include three health measures and eight socio-demographic covariates in the ana-
lysis. One health measure is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the worker was sick-
listed because of mental health problems, and 0 in all other cases. Another variable
measures the number of visits to general practitioners the year preceding the current
sick leave7. A third variable measures self-rated pain intensity on a scale from 1 (no pain)
to 10 (pain as bad as could be). This variable was measured at the interview, i.e. after the
sick-listed workers returned to work, which may introduce reverse causality. Therefore, we
include pain intensity only in the employment equation. Furthermore, as a robustness
check, we re-estimate our model without pain intensity.
The socio-demographic covariates comprise sex, age, cohabitation status, educational
attainment, seniority in current job, number of workers in the current company, and a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the current company is publicly owned and 0 in all
other cases. We measure age in three dummy variables, indicating whether the sick-
listed worker was under 45 years, 45 to 55 years, or above 55 years at the beginning of
the sick leave.
We also include a measure of previous employment experience (years employed since
1964) in the equation of the employment duration. We assume that previous employ-
ment experience is a measure of general labour market skills and, therefore, that the
variable significantly increases the employment duration. We do not include previous
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with company-specific seniority and our data do not allow us to estimate the effect of
the two variables simultaneously. Similarly, we include previous employment experi-
ence in the employment duration, but we do not include seniority. To improve the esti-
mation efficiency of the equation of the employment duration, we exclude highly
insignificant variables from this equation.
The variables are as follows: type of health problem, pain intensity, seniority, and
number of workers are survey variables, and the other variables are based on register
data. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables.3.4. Descriptive results
Figures 1 and 2, respectively, show the empirical hazard rates of returning to work and
of ending the return-to-work employment. The hazard rate of returning to the current
employer is very high at the beginning of the sick leave spell. Thus the hazard rate of
returning to both accommodated and non-accommodated work with the current em-
ployer is high during three to six months after the first day of work incapacity. From
the sixth month, the hazard rate to the current employer decreases gradually until the
12th month, and hereafter it remains on a fairly constant level. The pattern of returning
to work for a new employer differs from the pattern of returning to work for the

















Female (yes = 1) 0.653 0.477 0.650 0.478 0.673 0.471 0.614 0.488
Age 34.911 17.985 34.580 18.997 38.313** 11.679 34.968 18.449
Living with spouse (yes = 1) 0.798** 0.402 0.827*** 0.379 0.680 0.468 0.705 0.457
Primary educationa) (yes = 1) 0.221*** 0.416 0.265*** 0.443 0.320** 0.468 0.436 0.497
Secondary educationa) (yes = 1) 0.432 0.497 0.420 0.495 0.400 0.492 0.405 0.492
Postsecondary educationa)
(yes = 1)
0.347*** 0.477 0.314*** 0.465 0.280*** 0.451 0.159 0.367
Visits to general practitioner in
the year before the sick leave
8.230 7.486 8.177 7.411 9.487 7.672 9.227 8.209




20.140** 9.115 21.482*** 9.935 14.204*** 9.138 17.955 10.414
Seniority in monthsb) 153.159* 116.704 157.878** 141.091 72.686*** 89.626 129.312 137.173
Company size (number of
workers)c)
167.905 619.375 172.847 679.592 62.079** 122.665 142.580 375.653
Public sector company (yes = 1) 0.559* 0.498 0.562* 0.497 69.293 88.837 0.477 0.501
Note: Calculations based on 213 (accommodated job), 226 (non-accommodated job), 150 (new employer), and 220
individuals (not returning to work). Asterisks mark significant deviation from “Not returning to work” at a 1% level (***),
5% level (**), and 10% level.
a): Primary education covers the compulsory school period, i.e., nine years of basic school, and other preparatory
schooling such as high school. Secondary education includes all terminal educations (preparing the students for entry
directly into working life) except university degrees. Postsecondary education includes all types of university degrees.












Months after the beginning of the sick leave
Current employer, accommodated Current employer, not accommodated New employer
Figure 1 Hazard rates for returning to work. Hazard rates separately for returning to work in an
accommodated job for the current employer, to work in a non-accommodated job for the current
employer, and to work for a new employer.
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hazard rate to a new employer is low during the first months and high after one year.
The different return-to-work patterns may mean that the sick-listed workers first try to
return to work for the current employer, and only if doing so proves impossible they
try finding a new employer.
Figure 2 indicates that workplace accommodations may prolong employment dura-
tions. Thus during the first six months after returning to work for the current em-
ployer, individuals in accommodated jobs have a lower hazard rate out of employment
than individuals in non-accommodated jobs. Furthermore, Figure 2 indicates that sick-
listed workers who change working conditions because they change employer have
shorter employment durations than sick-listed workers who change working conditions
at the current employer.4. The econometric model
Workers returning to work with their current employer in an accommodated job may
differ from workers resuming work with their current employer in a job without ac-
commodations. Similarly, workers returning to work with a new employer may differ
from workers returning to work with their current employer. If these differences are
unobserved and have a bearing on the subsequent employment duration, we cannot
immediately identify the causal effect of workplace accommodations and change of
employer on the employment duration. To mitigate or correct for possible selection
effects, we estimate a distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
We use a discrete mixed proportional hazard rate model (van den Berg 2001) to sim-
ultaneously estimate two events. One equation models the sick-listed workers’ hazard
of returning to work either with the current employer in an accommodated job, with
the current employer in a non-accommodated job, or with a new employer. This equa-
tion corresponds to a series of multinomial logit model across time periods of dur-












Months after returning to work
Hazard rate out of the return-to-work job 
Current employer, accommodated Current employer, not accommodated New employer
Figure 2 Hazard rates out of the return-to-work job. Hazard rates separately for sick-listed workers
returning to work for the current employer in accommodated jobs, in non-accommodated jobs, and for
sick-listed workers returning to work for a new employer.
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corresponds to a binary logit model across time periods of new employment. The un-
observed heterogeneity is captured by a discrete distribution with a finite number of
mass points. This is a common approach in multivariate duration models (see e.g. Van
den Berg et al. 2002). This procedure allows the random effects of the two durations to
be dependent without imposing assumptions about the structure of the dependence.
We model two durations. One duration until returning to work, denoted t1, and sub-
sequently one duration of re-employment, denoted t2.
The equation of the hazard of returning to work, t1, is given by:
P D1 t1ð Þ ¼ d1 t1ð Þð Þ ¼
Xj¼3
j¼1 exp δ1jt1 þ β1jx1j þ ε1j
 1 d1 t1ð Þ¼jð Þ
1þ
Xj¼3
j¼1 exp δ1jt1 þ β1jx1j þ ε1j
  ð1Þ
where t1 is the time after the first day of the sick leave measured in months and where:
d1 t1ð Þ ¼
1 if returning to accommodated work with the current employer in period t1
2 if returning to non‐accommodated work with the current employer in period t1




and where 1(·) is a Boolean operator equalling one when the term inside the brackets is
true and zero otherwise. In addition, x1j is a vector of variables affecting the hazard rate
of returning to accommodated work (j =1), non-accommodated work (j = 2) and to a
new employer (j = 3), and β1j; j = 1, 2, 3 is a corresponding row vector of regression coef-
ficients. The parameter δ1jt1 ; j ¼ 1; 2; 3 are time-specific intercept terms measuring dur-
ation dependence in the hazard rate to work, and ε1j are destination specific
unobserved random effects. We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is independ-
ent of observed variables and time invariant.
The equation of the hazard of ending the employment after returning to work is
given by:
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  ¼ exp δ2t2 þ γ11 d1 t2ð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ þ γ21 d1 t2ð Þ ¼ 3ð Þ þ β2x2 þ ε2ð Þd2 t2ð Þ
1þ exp δ2t2 þ γ11 d1 t2ð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ þ γ21 d1 t2ð Þ ¼ 3ð Þ þ β2x2 þ ε2ð Þ
ð2Þ
where:
d2 t2ð Þ ¼ 1 if ending the employment in period t20 otherwise:

and x2 are observed variables with β2 as the two corresponding row vectors of regres-
sion coefficients. The coefficient γ1 measures the effect of having returned to work
with the current employer in an accommodated job on the hazard rate out of employ-
ment. Similarly, γ2 captures the effect of having returned to work with a new employer.
The parameter δ2t2 is a time-specific intercept term measuring duration dependence in
the hazard rate out of the employment, and the coefficient ε2 measures the unobserved
effects in the hazard rate.
Following Heckman and Singer (1984) for the univariate case and van den Berg et al.
(2002) for the multivariate extension, we assume that ε11, ε12, ε13, ε2 takes on a finite
number of values (mass points), the first being (0,0,0,0) and subsequently
ε111;ε121;ε131;ε12ð Þ, ε112;ε122;ε132;ε22ð Þ;…. The mass points are distributed with prob-
ability p0,0,0,0 pε111;ε121;ε131;ε12 , pε112;ε122;ε132;ε22 ;…:; with Σ jpe11j;e12j;e13j;e2j ¼ 1. Both mass points
and probabilities are estimated as parameters in the likelihood function. Assuming a fi-
nite number of mass points, see Frühwirt-Schnatter (2006), standard likelihood regular-
ity conditions holds.
Denoting the multivariate discrete duration until returning to regular working hours
or censoring as T1i and the subsequent duration of employment, T2i we calculate the
individual contribution to the log-likelihood function as:






P D1 tð Þ ¼ d1jej1
 1−dt12 YT 2i
t1¼1
P D2 tð Þ ¼ d2jej2
 " #
ð3Þ
This likelihood is optimized with respect to the regression parameters in the two logitmodels for the time until returning to work and the time until ending the employment
after returning to work, and with respect to the parameters of the discrete mixture dis-
tribution of unobserved random effects. By allowing the random effects to be corre-
lated, the model jointly determines the selection to returning to work (with the current
employer in an accommodated job and with a new employer) and the selection out of
employment after returning to work. Doing so allows us to take into account potential
selection effects because we condition upon them in the model, meaning that the esti-
mates of workplace accommodations and new employer have a causal interpretation.
5. Findings
Table 3 shows the estimates of the simultaneously estimated hazard rate model of
returning to work and of ending the employment after returning to work. In the model,
we include a dummy variable measuring whether the workers returning to work for the
current employer received an accommodation. A positive coefficient implies a positive
effect on the hazard rate and a negative effect on the duration. Column 2, 3 and 4
Table 3 Hazard rate model of returning to work and of ending employment after
returning to work









Female (yes = 1) −0.061 (0.217) −0.035 (0.209) 0.138 (0.278) - - -d)
45-55 years (yes = 1) −0.624 (0.267)** −0.307 (0.245) −0.710 (0.297)** −0.096 (0.278)
Older than 55 years (yes = 1) −0.564 (0.327)* −0.149 (0.312) −2.311 (0.689)*** 0.796 (0.342)
Living with spouse (yes = 1) 0.453 (0.235)* 0.660 (0.245)*** 0.079 (0.269) - - -d)
Secondary education
(yes = 1)
0.641 (0.255)** 0.328 (0.224) 0.372 (0.287) - - -d)
Postsecondary education
(yes = 1)
1.272 (0.355)*** 0.890 (0.291)*** 1.065 (0.343)*** - - -d)
Visits to GP before
sick leavea)
−0.166 (0.135) −0.106 (0.127) 0.054 (0.166) −0.109 (0.146)
Mental illness (yes = 1) −0.505 (0.225)** −0.424 (0.216)** 0.687 (0.264)*** - - -d)
Pain intensity (1–10) - - - - - - - - - 0.083 (0.040)**
Employment
experience
- - - - - - - - - −0.029 (0.013)**
Seniority in monthsb) 0.225 (0.084)*** 0.163 (0.081)** −0.369 (0.145)** - - -d)
Company sizeb) 0.009 (0.019) 0.010 (0.018) −0.240 (0.098)** - - -d)
Public sector company
(yes = 1)
0.217 (0.218) 0.317 (0.217) −0.391 (0.275) −0.322 (0.208)
New employer (yes = 1) - - - - - - - - - 0.592 (0.254)**
Accommodation (yes = 1) - - - - - - - - - −0.527 (0.267)**
Baseline, period 2c) −0.403 (0.214)* −0.172 (0.212) 0.356 (0.304) −0.090 (0.206)
Baseline, period 3c) −0.931 (0.362)*** −0.837 (0.268)*** 0.988 (0.439)** - - -
Baseline, period 4c) −1.387 (0.624)** −1.321 (0.495)*** 1.718 (0.590)*** - - -
Constant −4.321 (1.012)*** −4.376 (0.895)*** −5.206 (0.640)*** −3.707 (0.497)***
Random effects 2.342 (0.947)** 2.325 (0.808)*** 2.974 (0.597)*** 0.046 (0.437)
Fraction with
random effect
0.541 0.541 0.541 0.541
Note: N = 809. The hazard rate models are estimated simultaneously. See Table 2 for more information about the
variables. S.E. between brackets. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%. All equations include a dummy variable
(not shown) that equal 1 when information about company size (56 persons) is missing. The return-to-work equations
also include a dummy variables (not shown) that equal 1 when information about seniority (32 persons) is missing. a):
Multiplied with 100. b): Multiplied with 10. c): Baseline hazard periods, accommodated work: period 1: 3 months, period
2: 4–5 months, period 3: 6–8 months, period 4: >9 months. d): The variable was excluded from the model because it was
highly insignificant. Baseline hazard periods, non-accommodated work: period 1: 3 months, period 2: 4 months, period 3:
5–7 months, period 4: >8 months. Baseline hazard periods, new employer: period 1: 3–5 months, period 2: 6–9 months,
period 3: 10–14 months, period 4: >15 months. Baseline hazard periods, employment duration: period 1: 1–7 months,
period 2: >8 months.
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current employer in an accommodated job, the current employer in a non-
accommodated job, or a new employer. Column 5 depicts the estimates of the hazard
rate model of ending the employment, after the sick-listed workers have resumed work.5.1. The selection to work
The findings suggest a strong selection of sick-listed workers into work. The selection
is influenced by both observed and unobserved variables. First, overall, workers under
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ondary education, have a high hazard rate to all three types of work.
Second, age and education appear to be more important for returning to work both
with the current employer in an accommodated job and with a new employer than for
returning to work with the current employer in a job without accommodations. For ex-
ample, the coefficient of age over 55 years is −0.564 in the equations of returning to
work with the current employer in an accommodated job and −2.311 in the equations
of returning to work with a new employer, whereas the coefficient is −0.149 in the
equation of returning to work with the current employer without accommodations.
Third, some variables have a different effect on the hazard to work for a new em-
ployer and on the hazard to work with the current employer. Thus seniority increases
the hazard to work with the current employer but reduces the hazard to work with a
new employer. This finding supports company-specific human capital (long seniority)
being valuable to the current employer increasing the chance that a sick-listed worker
stays with the current employer. In contrast, company specific human capital may not
have the same value to a new employer. Therefore, the sick-listed worker’s reservation
wage may exceed the wage offer from a new employer, reducing the sick-listed worker’s
chance of returning to work with a new employer. While mental health problems have
a significant and positive effect on the hazard rate to work with a new employer, it has
a negative impact on the hazard rate to work with the current employer. Compared to
a sick-listed worker without mental health problems, a worker with mental health
problems has approximately 37 per cent lower probability of returning to the current
employer during each month of the observation period and a 99 per cent higher ability
of returning to a new employer. This marked difference could mean that the causes of
the mental health problems are often related to the current employer, e.g. a poor work-
ing environment or a personal conflict. In such cases, returning to a new employer may
be more feasible than returning to the current employer.
Fourth, the model’s unobserved heterogeneity components suggest that unobserved
characteristics affect the hazard of returning to work. As mentioned in the previous
section, we capture unobserved heterogeneity through a discrete multivariate discrete
distribution with a finite number of mass points. As is often the case in multivariate
duration models, in our estimations we identify only one mass point in addition to the
reference mass point (0,0,0,0), cf. van den Berg et al. (2002). The estimated additional
mass point has positive values for all four durations in the model. The additional multi-
variate mass point is positive, large and statistically significant for the three return to
work durations. It is also positive but small and insignificant for the employment dur-
ation. The estimated mass point has a probability of fifty-four per cent, leaving the ref-
erence mass point with forty six per cent. This means that a little more than half of the
sick-listed workers have unobserved characteristics that significantly increase the prob-
ability of returning to work with both the current employer (with or without accommo-
dations) and with a new employer, because the estimated mass point is significant and
positive for the three return to work hazard rates compared to the group of workers
represented by the reference mass point. The effects are strong, e.g. the coefficient of
returning to work with a new employer is 2.974 (with a p-value of 0.000). However, the
unobserved characteristics that affect the selection into work do not affect the subse-
quent employment duration, as the coefficient of the random effects of the employment
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small size and insignificance of the additional mass point for the employment duration
means that there are almost no differences in the effect of unobservables on the em-
ployment duration between the those workers that have a higher versus a lower hazard
rate of returning to work. Consequently, the estimations of the employment duration
would have yielded almost the same results had we used a single-spell hazard rate
model without random effects instead of a simultaneously estimated hazard rate model
with random effects. This result may seem surprising and we return to the credibility
of our estimated mass point for the employment duration in the robust checks below.5.2. The employment duration
Table 3 also shows that sick-listed workers returning to work with their current em-
ployer in an accommodated job have a significantly lower hazard rate out of employ-
ment than workers returning to work with their current employer in a job without
accommodations. Thus the coefficient of workplace accommodations is negative
(−0.527) and significant at a 5 per cent level (p-value of 0.049), meaning that the
workers in an accommodated job have a 41 per cent lower probability each month of
ending their employment than workers without accommodations.
Furthermore, those returning to work with their current employer in an accommo-
dated job on average also have significantly lower exit rates than those returning to
work with a new employer. Indeed, workers returning to their current employer with-
out accommodations also have a significantly lower exit rate than those returning to a
new employer; i.e., the coefficient of the variable of new employer (0.592) is significant
at a 5 per cent level. Put differently, the sick-listed workers returning to work with a
new employer terminate their employment much more quickly than those returning to
work with their current employer. This finding supports the hypothesis that the job
match between workers with a new employer is of poorer quality than the match be-
tween workers remaining with their current employer.
Table 4 shows the coefficients of a model with a dummy variable for each of the four
types of workplace accommodations the workers may receive, i.e. reduced working
hours, a new job, light duties, and adaptations in terms of equipment or office
remodelling.
Among the four types of workplace accommodations, a reduction in the working
hours and special equipment or office remodelling have the biggest effects on the em-
ployment duration. Both of these variables reduce the hazard rate of ending employ-
ment with 38 per cent. However, both variables are insignificant at a 10 per cent level
(p-value of 0.130 and 0.328, respectively). The other types of accommodations (a new job
and light duties) are insignificant, with p-values of 0.960 (new job) and 0.555 (light duty).
Our finding that accommodations increase employment durations, cf. Table 3, is in
line with previous studies (Burkhauser et al. 1995; Campolieti 2005). In contrast, the ef-
fects of several of the other covariates differ from the effect found in previous studies.
For example, Campolieti (2005) finds that sex, cohabitation status, and educational at-
tainment have a significant impact on the employment duration. These covariates are
completely insignificant in our analyses (and, therefore, we exclude them from our final
specification).
Table 4 Hazard rate model of returning to work with four types of workplace
accommodations and of ending employment after returning to work









Female (yes = 1) −0.061 (0.217) −0.035 (0.210) 0.138 (0.278) - - -d)
45-55 years (yes = 1) −0.624 (0.267)** −0.307 (0.245) −0.710 (0.297)** −0.113 (0.280)
Older than 55 years (yes = 1) −0.564 (0.327)* −0.149 (0.312) −2.311 (0.689)*** −0786 (0.342)**
Living with spouse (yes = 1) 0.453 (0.236)* 0.660 (0.245)*** 0.079 (0.269) - - -d)
Secondary education
(yes = 1)
0.641 (0.255)** 0.328 (0.224) 0.372 (0.287) - - -d)
Postsecondary education
(yes = 1)
1.273 (0.355)*** 0.889 (0.291)*** 1.065 (0.343)*** - - -d)
Visits to GP before sick leavea) −0.166 (0.135) −0.106 (0.127) 0.054 (0.166) −0.100 (0.146)
Mental illness (yes = 1) −0.505 (0.225)** −0.423 (0.216)** 0.687 (0.264)*** - - -d)
Pain intensity (1–10) - - - - - - - - - 0.092 (0.040)**
Employment experience - - - - - - - - - −0.030 (0.013)**
Seniority in monthsb) 0.225 (0.083)*** 0.163 (0.081)** −0.370 (0.145)** - - -d)
Company sizeb) 0.009 (0.019) 0.010 (0.018) −0.240 (0.098)** - - -d)
Public sector company
(yes = 1)
0.217 (0.218) 0.317 (0.217) −0.391 (0.275) −0.329 (0.210)
New employer (yes = 1) - - - - - - - - - 0.573 (0.251)**
Reduced working hours
(yes = 1)
- - - - - - - - - −0.476 (0.314)
New job (yes = 1) - - - - - - - - - 0.021 (0.424)
Light duties (yes = 1) - - - - - - - - - −0.273 (0.463)
Other adaptations (yes = 1) - - - - - - - - - −0.471 (0.481)
Baseline, period 2c) −0.403 (0.214)* −0.172 (0.212) 0.356 (0.304) −0.086 (0.206)
Baseline, period 3c) −0.931 (0.362)*** −0.837 (0.268)*** 0.988 (0.439)** - - -
Baseline, period 4c) −1.387 (0.623)** −1.322 (0.496)*** 1.718 (0.590)*** - - -
Constant −4.322 (1.012)*** −4.375 (0.896)*** −5.206 (0.640)*** −3.720 (0.498)***
Random effects 2.343 (0.946)** 2.324 (0.809)*** 2.974 (0.596)*** 0.046 (0.441)
Fraction with random effect 0.541 0.541 0.541 0.541
Note: N = 779 The hazard rate models are estimated simultaneously. See Table 2 for more information about the
variables. S.E. between brackets. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%. All equations include a dummy variable
(not shown) that equal 1 when information about company size (56 persons) is missing. The return-to-work equations
also include a dummy variables (not shown) that equal 1 when information about seniority (32 persons) is missing.
a): Multiplied with 100. b): Multiplied with 10. c): Baseline hazard periods, accommodated work: period 1: 3 months,
period 2: 4–5 months, period 3: 6–8 months, period 4: >9 months. d): The variable was excluded from the model because
it was highly insignificant. Baseline hazard periods, non-accommodated work: period 1: 3 months, period 2: 4 months,
period 3: 5–7 months, period 4: >8 months. Baseline hazard periods, new employer: period 1: 3–5 months, period 2: 6–9
months, period 3: 10–14 months, period 4: >15 months. Baseline hazard periods, employment duration: period 1: 1–7
months, period 2: >8 months.
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We included self-rated pain intensity in our model, which may introduce reverse caus-
ality. To get an impression of whether self-rated pain intensity bias the estimated effect
of workplace accommodations, we re-estimate the model in Table 3 without pain inten-
sity. When we exclude pain intensity from the model, the coefficient of workplace ac-
commodations decreases only slightly (from −0.527 to −0.500), indicating that the
possible endogeneity of pain intensity has a very limited impact on the estimate of
workplace accommodations.
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for unobserved heterogeneity. The insignificant coefficient of the random effects of the
employment duration suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity is negligible. As a test
of the validity of this assumption, we re-estimate the model in Table 3, adding covari-
ates of pre-disability labour market outcomes (cf. Heckman et al. 1999). If our model
does not fully account for unobserved differences, we should expect that the past
labour market outcomes have a significant impact on the employment duration after
returning to work. We include four covariates. One dummy variable measures whether
the worker previously (i.e. before the present sick leave) was sick-listed for at least two
months. Another dummy variable measures whether the worker was unemployed at
any time during the 24 months preceding the present sick leave. We also include the
number of pre-sick leave working hours and the duration from the beginning of the
present sick leave until returning to work. We expect that individuals with previous pe-
riods of long-term sick leave, previous periods of unemployment, few working hours,
and long return-to-work durations have a relatively limited employment capacity, for
example, because they have limited human capital or suffer from relatively serious
health problems. All four covariates are insignificant, with p-values between 0.182 and
0.838 (see Table 5), supporting the assumption of no significant unobserved heterogen-
eity in the equation of the employment duration. However, ultimately, we cannot be
sure that our model takes all unobserved heterogeneity into account, so interpretation
should be cautious.6. Conclusion
Previous research shows that workers who acquire a work disability may either change
employer or stay with their current employer in an accommodated job. Previous re-
search also shows that workplace accommodations increase the employment duration
of disabled workers and that change of employer reduces wages and the probability ofTable 5 Selected results from four hazard rate models of ending employment after




Accommodation (yes = 1) −0.541(0.257)**
Previously sick-listed 2 months or more (yes = 1) −0.235(0.230)
Model 2
Accommodation (yes = 1) −0.549(0.256)**
Unemployed during the 24 months preceding the present sick leave (yes = 1) −0.096(0.470)
Model 3
Accommodation (yes = 1) −0.543(0.256)**
Pre-sick leave working hours 0.019(0.014)
Model 4
Accommodation (yes = 1) −0.554 (0.262)**
Duration until returning to work −0.012 (0.046)
Note: N = 809. Same models as in Table 3, except for ‘return-to-work duration’. S.E. between brackets. Significance levels:
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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changes affect the employment duration of long-term sick-listed workers.
We use combined survey and register data about of 809 workers who were continuously
sick-listed more than eight weeks. Using a joint proportional mixed hazard rate model, we
simultaneously estimate two durations. The first duration concerns the time until returning
to work in either an accommodated job with the current employer, a non-accommodated
job with the current employer, or a job with a new employer. The second duration com-
prises the duration of the employment after returning to work.
Providing new evidence about labour market outcomes following a return to work
with a new employer, we find that sick-listed workers returning to work with a new em-
ployer have shorter employment durations than those returning to work with the
current employer. This finding is in line with previous studies suggesting that a change
of employer reduces wages (Campolieti and Krashinsy 2006) thus supporting the
hypothesis that the job match between a (previously) sick-listed employee and a new
employer relatively often is suboptimal, leading to separation.
Consistent with previous studies, we find that workplace accommodations increase
the subsequent employment duration. In other words, this study suggests that a reduc-
tion of job demands increases subsequent employment durations.6.1. Highlights
 We study sick-listed workers’ employment durations after they have returned to work
 Workplace accommodations increase the employment duration with current
employer
 Sick-listed workers changing workplace have relatively short employment durationsEndnotes
1Several epidemiologists have studied how workplace-based interventions affect
disabled workers’ probability of returning to work, for literature reviews, see van
Oostrom et al. (2009) and Palmer et al. (2012). In contrast to our study, these studies
do not assess the labour market attachment of disabled workers after they return to
work. Furthermore, the majority of these studies concern specially designed inter-
ventions designed by medical or occupational experts, who instruct trained profes-
sionals in how to implement the specific program, and, therefore, the results may
not be generalizable.
2This assumption is supported by the fact that the first court decision about the
European Union directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation was made
in October 2007, almost three years after the ratification.
3Using such a sampling window may lead to under-sampling of very long sick leave
cases, because it is less likely that long-lasting cases end during the seven-month win-
dow than cases with a short duration end during this period. This potential bias is ap-
parently limited. Using the same sampling scheme, when Høgelund et al. (2003)
compared the distribution of the sick leave duration in the sample with the distribution
in the population of all Danish sick leave cases ending during a one-year period, they
found that the two distributions were similar.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/174Ideally, we would like to estimate a model with flexjob as a separate exit state. How-
ever, with only fifty-six sick-listed workers in our sample returning to work in a flexjob,
we cannot identify the random effects distribution.
5As receipt of a disability benefit is an absorbing exit state preventing people from
returning to work at a later point, we should estimate a random effects competing risk
model with disability benefit as a fourth exit state. Unfortunately, we were unable to
identify the random effect distribution for this model.
6Thirty persons did not answer all four accommodation questions. We include these
persons in the analysis of the overall effect of workplace accommodations but exclude
them from the analysis of the effect of each of the four accommodations.
7We included a similar measure, the number of visits to medical specialists the year
before and the current sick leave, in preliminary versions of our model. As the variable
did not significantly contribute to the estimation of the outcome variables, we excluded
the variable from the estimations.
8In principle, when discrete durations represent underlying latent continuous dura-
tions, the discrete observed durations should follow a c-log-log distribution; see
Høgelund et al. (2010). However, with many discrete time points the difference between
the c-log-log and the logit becomes immaterial.
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